

ANGLAIS

I. VERSION

Traduire en français le texte ci-dessous

For the three centuries or so since the fossil-fuel age began in earnest, living standards and emissions have risen hand in hand. Yet over the past decade a growing number of countries -- 33 by *The Economist's* count, home to over 1bn people -- have managed to increase their GDP while reducing their emissions.

After a peak in 2007 America reduced its territorial emissions from 6.13bn tonnes of carbondioxide equivalent to 5.26bn before the pandemic. And that is not because Americans are simply importing their toys and electronics from dirtier places. Strikingly, consumption emissions, which include a measure of the carbon embedded in imports, have fallen by 15% over the same period.

Decoupling is largely a result of two big shifts. One is the changing structure of economies. As countries became richer they expanded their service sectors, which use less energy than manufacturing. In Britain, the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, four-fifths of output is now generated by accountants, shop assistants and other service workers. Even in Germany, famed for its industrial prowess, manufacturing's share of GDP is falling. That has reduced the energy intensity of growth.

Second, imports are getting greener. In the decade after the financial crisis, China's export sector decarbonised faster than the rest of its economy. This has helped reduce the total carbon footprint of rich countries. Furthermore, manufacturing is shifting out of China, which is more polluting, per dollar of GDP, than India or Indonesia.

Adapté de *The Economist*

II. THÈME

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Exercices de création artistique, cours de théâtre, de photographie, de danse, de musique ou d'histoire de l'art, associations étudiantes de dessin, de couture, etc. : comme de nombreux étudiants en école d'ingénieurs, Lily Houël, 20 ans, a été quelque peu « surprise » quand elle a découvert en 2020 la pédagogie originale de l'Ecole de biologie industrielle (EBI).

« Lorsqu'on nous donne par exemple dix minutes pour inventer et raconter devant nos camarades une histoire de notre choix avec une intrigue, un développement et un dénouement, on se dit, de prime abord, que c'est bizarre comme exercice en école d'ingénieurs, et qu'on ne va pas s'en sortir, illustre Lily Houël, mais en fait si : il en ressort des récits très originaux. On comprend qu'on peut se permettre de faire des choses un peu folles sans avoir un retour négatif, qu'on peut sortir des sentiers battus, assumer notre originalité, et surtout appliquer cela au travail ».

Attend-on désormais des jeunes futurs ingénieurs qu'ils sachent aussi « faire des choses un peu folles », comme elle dit ? Si elle ne connaissait pas le concept de *mad skills* avant qu'on ne lui en parle, ces dernières seraient pourtant de plus en plus recherchées par les entreprises aujourd'hui. La Conférence des directeurs des écoles françaises d'ingénieurs (CDEFI) leur a même consacré une discussion lors de son colloque annuel, en juin, qui se penchait sur « les métiers et compétences d'avenir » à développer chez les futurs ingénieurs.

Adapté du *Monde*

III. EXPRESSION ÉCRITE

Rebelling Against Trump Is Not the Same as Rebelling Against Trumpism

Republican elites are done with Donald Trump, and this time, they mean it.

Since the conservative “red wave” splashed on shore like gentle foam at low tide, some Republican Party bigs have begun reconsidering the GOP’s relationship with Donald Trump. Republicans took back the House with a slim margin, but Democrats kept the Senate, a dismal result given President Joe Biden’s low approval ratings and the continued toll of inflation. The consensus among the right-wing intelligentsia is that they fell well short of expectations.

Fox News, typically a geyser of Trump worship, spent the aftermath of the midterms promoting Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, who possesses Trump’s authoritarian instincts but fewer personality defects. *National Review* published an editorial saying that Trump should not run for president again. Instead of sharing their skepticism of Trump anonymously with reporters, several Republican elected officials have actually gone on the record with their skepticism of the former president.

Still, we’ve seen Republicans try to distance themselves from Trump before. Early in the 2016 primary, Republican leaders and conservative-media figures were willing to acknowledge that Trump was overtly racist, but when he won the nomination, nearly all of them transformed into loyal stooges. The release of the audio of Trump confessing to “grabbing” women “by the pussy” led to disavowals, but then to disavowals of the disavowals in relatively short order. The family-separation policy, the attempt to strong-arm Ukrainian leadership into falsely implicating then-candidate Biden in a crime, the attempt to overthrow the American constitutional order by force after losing the 2020 election—there is simply no shortage of moments in which conservatives had reason to break with Trump.

And they always come crawling back. As long as Trump is seen as helping Republicans politically, he can shoot as many people on Fifth Avenue as he likes.

This latest break with Trump, in other words, may not be permanent. *National Review* was famously *Never Trump* in 2016, before becoming *Please, Mr. Trump, may I have another* after he won the primary. This latest break with Trump is not about morality or principle, but about the possibility that his influence is harming the GOP’s electoral prospects. Trump’s bigotry, his authoritarianism, even his fomenting an insurrection were not deal-breakers. But hurting Republican electoral prospects? That might be.

In some sense, that’s logical. Even in a democracy, it is foolish to expect politicians of any party or ideology to act consistently on principle rather than self-interest. If Republican perception of their self-interest leads them to abandon an unstable, corrupt, and cruel leader, well, that’s better than the alternative of not abandoning him at all.

But precisely because the rejection of Trump is a matter of political interest and not principle, it’s easy to imagine all of these Republican elites reversing themselves once again if circumstances demand, and returning to their previous role as loyal Trump sycophants, if that perception changes.

Yet even if this rejection of Trump lasts, the underlying structural factors that led to Trump’s rise, in particular the way that counter majoritarian aspects of the American system, like the Senate and Electoral College, enhance the influence of the most conservative segments of the electorate, remain intact. As long as the GOP relies on taking advantage of these elements of the system to gain and maintain power rather than winning over the majority of the electorate, it will continue to flit from one existential culture-war conflict to another, the better to convince its constituents that the apocalypse is imminent unless Republicans alone are allowed to govern.

Whoever comes after Trump will likely share his most politically dangerous ideological convictions: contempt for democracy, a belief that the rival party’s constituencies are inherently illegitimate, and a disdain for the rights of those the GOP coalition considers beneath it.

Right-wing elites concerned about Trump’s political effectiveness will not likely share the same worries about his heir. Without structural changes to that system, sustained political defeat, or shifts in the nature

of the Republican coalition, Trump may go, but the conservative demand for Trumpism will remain. And as long as that is the case, the rise of another Trump by a different name is an inevitability.

From *The Atlantic*

Répondre en anglais aux 2 questions suivantes (250 mots par question, + ou – 10%) :

- 1) Explain and discuss the fluctuations of conservatives over Donald Trump.
- 2) Should we always oppose self-interests and principles in politics?

-- Fin du sujet d'anglais --